Research on Selective Disposal of Available for Sale Securities under K-IFRS
Asian Tax Journal Vol. 19 No. 2 (2018), pp. 111-138
Abstract
This study examine whether the earnings management using the selective disposal of available for sale financial assets are differ after the adoption of K-IFRS. First of all, it is separated the firms to avoid losses and the earnings decreases by reported Burgstahler and Dichev(1997) for the incentive of earnings management using the selective disposal of available for sale financial assets. According to the empirical analysis results, the firms to avoid losses manage earnings by using the selective disposal of available for sale financial assets before the adoption of K-IFRS, but is not significant during total sample period and after the adoption of K-IFRS. Also, the firms to earnings decreases is negative during total sample period and before the adoption of K-IFRS. But the result of its analysis is not significant, partially support the first hypothesis. The result of second hypothesis related to the selective disposal of available for sale financial assets and the adoption of K-IFRS is significant that all of the firms to avoid losses and earnings decreases tend to decrease the selective disposal of available for sale financial assets after the adoption of K-IFRS compared before the adoption of K-IFRS. The paper has the following contributions. First, earnings management incentives are separated the firms to avoid losses and the earnings decreases based on Burgstahler and Dichev(1997), each their incentives are analyzed the effect of the selective disposal of available for sale financial assets. Second, it can provides empirical evidence related to use the method of earnings management after the adoption and application of K-IFRS No.1109.
Keywords
- available for sales security
- K-IFRS
- earning management
- selective disposal7)
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