A Study on Corporate Governance Quality and Shareholder Returns:Focusing on Compliance with Key Indicators in Corporate Governance Reports
Asian Tax Journal Vol. 27 No. 1 (2026), pp. 131-171
Abstract
This study empirically analyzes the impact of corporate governance quality on shareholder returns. Korean firms have persistently suffered from undervaluation, a phenomenon often attributed to low levels of shareholder returns and weak corporate governance. In order to empirically analyzes the impact of corporate governance quality on shareholder returns, this study uses data on compliance with the Key Indicators in Corporate Governance Reports disclosed from 2018 to 2024. The main empirical results are as follows. First, we find that companies with higher compliance rates for the Key Indicators in Corporate Governance Reports exhibited significantly higher shareholder returns. Specifically, higher compliance with the aggregate Key Indicators, as well as indicators related to shareholders and the board of directors, was associated with significantly higher shareholder returns. However, compliance with indicators related to audit body did not have a significant effect on shareholder returns. Second, we find that the mandatory policy for the “separate election of audit committee members”, applicable to listed companies with assets exceeding 2 trillion KRW after December 29, 2020, have a positive policy effect, increasing shareholder returns for the subject firms. These findings suggest that improvements in corporate governance can lead to increased shareholder returns. Specifically, activities and institutional mechanisms for improving governance—such as securing board independence, protecting shareholder rights, and the separate election of audit committee members—can serve as effective means to enhance shareholder payouts. the significance of this study is that the quality of corporate governance significantly influences shareholder returns.
Keywords
- Corporate Governance Quality
- Shareholder Returns
- Key Indicators in Corporate Governance Reports
- Separate Election of Audit Committee Members
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